Two parameters determine a mortgage's credit risk: probability of default and loss severity given default. While there is a growing body of research relevant to the modeling and estimation of mortgage default, there are few studies on loss severity (the percentage lost in the event of default) because of limited data. New data released by Freddie Mac, however, offer analysts the ability to assess mortgage loans made over 13 years for their loss severity. This robust database of more than 17 million loans offers a range of new and useful insights, by state, into the ultimate financial losses associated with a loan after it experiences a credit event. The addition of loan performance information beyond the credit event is a new and welcome addition to the single-family loan-level dataset.
What Do the New Data Include?
Historically, data allowed market participants to track loans only through the advent of a credit event.
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae (the GSEs) define a credit event as a loan going 180 days delinquent or being liquidated through a deed-in-lieu, short sale, foreclosure sale, or REO before the 180-day delinquency point. Once a loan experienced a credit event, it was removed from the dataset and the loss was calculated by multiplying the balance affected by a predetermined severity.
In support of their risk-sharing deals, in 2013 the GSEs began releasing quarterly performance data on their 30-year full-documentation amortizing book of business. In November 2014, Freddie Mac's quarterly release contained a broader dataset that included loan dispositions. This increased transparency may indicate that Freddie anticipates issuing a deal in which risk-sharing payments will be triggered by actual severities rather than by credit events.
Freddie's new data allow analysts to calculate actual severities by various credit event types and timing of dispositions, and to compare actual severities to the predetermined severities on risk-sharing deals. In addition, the new data allow market participants to break down loss severity into its various components: net sale proceeds, expenses, MI recoveries, and non-MI recoveries. This is also the first time the GSEs have released loan-level loss data for mortgages. Before this, loss data had been available only on mortgages that were collateral for private-label securities.
What Happens to Loans That Experience a Credit Event?
How Common Are These Credit Events? Table 2 shows the current status of 13 years of loans that have encountered credit events, sorted by vintage and LTV. Not all loans that experience a credit event will be liquidated; some will be rehabilitated. Because of long timelines, some others will still be in process. We identify eight paths for loans that experience credit events: (1) current without a modification, 2 (2) modified and current on the modification, (3) prepay without modification, (4) prepay after modification, (5) modified and not current on the modification, (6) in pipeline with no modification, (7) liquidated via a foreclosure alternative (deed-in-lieu, short sales, foreclosure sale) and (8) liquidated through REO. Under outcomes 1 through 4, the loans are rehabilitated and, thus, we assume there is no loss. Under outcomes 5 through 8, the loans have either been liquidated or will be liquidated, and, thus, have a loss expectation.
To be more explicit, we assume that loans that have been modified but are not current on their modification, and those in the foreclosure pipeline that have never been modified, are likely to eventually be liquidated. depreciation and is behind on his payments can sell the home without a loss). It also makes rehabilitation less attractive for the borrower, as the house will likely have negative equity. Similarly, the percentage of loans that will eventually liquidate is higher during the crisis years, as home price deterioration put many mortgages into a negative equity situation. Table 3 shows the percent of loans we expect to liquidate, by LTV and FICO buckets, in a manner consistent with table 1. 
L O S S S E V E R I T Y O N R E S I D E N T I A L M O R T G A G E S

Comparison of Loss Severities to Preset Severities in the STACR Deals
This analysis allows us to compare the severities actually experienced with the preset severities that
Freddie Mac assumes in its credit risk transfer program, known as the Structured Agency Credit Risk (STACR) deals. Based on our assessment, the preset severity schedule in the STACR deals produces results on historical data that are very close to the actual severity levels for the 60-to-80-LTV loans, but the preset severity schedule is much higher than the actual levels for the over-80 LTV loans.
To assess the expected severity for loans that have experienced credit events, we multiply the percentage of loans that we expect to liquidate by the severity on the loans that have already percent. In general, when using the preset severity schedule on the over-80-LTV mortgages the derived severities are very close to the derived severities on the 60-to-80-LTV mortgages (table 5) . However, the actual severities on the over-80-LTV mortgages are much lower than the preset severity schedule.
Some readers may note that we have not included lost interest in our calculation of severity. period had more home price appreciation, and hence lower severities. Similarly, lower-LTV loans (60 and under) have more equity and hence lower severities than the 60-to-80-LTV bucket. However, the over-80-LTV bucket had severities not too different from, and in many cases less than, the 60-andunder-LTV bucket, owing to the presence of mortgage insurance.
Differences by Loan Size
Loss severities are also affected by loan size (table 6) 
Differences by State of Origination
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